INSURANCE-RELATED COURT CASES
Digested from case reports published online
COURT DECISIONS
Injured motorist prevails
Brian M. Wood was driving through an intersection in Auburn, Alabama, when his vehicle was T-boned by a vehicle being driven by Mark Stafford. Brian and his wife, Jennifer A. Wood, sued Stafford, an uninsured motorist, in the Lee Circuit Court, alleging claims of negligence, wantonness, and loss of consortium. Because Stafford was uninsured, the Woods also sued their automobile insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, seeking uninsured motorist benefits.
The Woods unsuccessfully attempted to serve Stafford. The Woods sought to proceed to a final judgment against State Farm.
The trial court held a jury trial at which several witnesses testified. At the close of the Woods’ evidence, State Farm moved for a judgment as a matter of law (JML) on its contributory negligence defense and on the Woods’ wantonness claim, and the trial court denied that motion. State Farm renewed its motion for a JML at the close of all the evidence, and the trial court denied that motion as well.
The trial court charged the jury on claims of negligence and wantonness, the affirmative defense of contributory negligence, and the doctrine of subsequent negligence.
The jury returned a verdict in the Woods’ favor, awarding them $700,000 in compensatory damages, and the trial court entered a judgment on that verdict. The jury did not award any punitive damages. State Farm filed a post-judgment motion that challenged the judgment on several grounds, including whether the wantonness claim should have gone to the jury. The post-judgment motion was denied, and State Farm appealed.
As Brian attempted to cross the intersection, his vehicle was T- boned by Stafford’s vehicle, causing permanent injury to Brian. The collision occurred in the pass-through lane. Pam Stirling, an accident reconstruction expert, testified at trial that Stafford’s vehicle was traveling between 69 and 78 miles per hour when it collided with Brian’s vehicle. The speed limit was 55 miles per hour.
On appeal, State Farm first argued that the trial court erred by giving the jury an instruction on the doctrine of subsequent negligence. The doctrine of subsequent negligence, also known as the last clear chance doctrine, is a method of establishing liability despite a plaintiff’s contributory negligence. That is, a plaintiff’s contributory negligence is not a defense to a defendant’s subsequent negligence.
The record indicated that State Farm’s attorney was confused about the nature and import of the subsequent negligence doctrine. At most, she objected to the subsequent negligence charge on the ground that it was “redundant.” On appeal, however, State Farm did not argue that ground. Rather it argued that the subsequent negligence charge should not have been given because, State Farm said, there was insufficient evidence to support that charge. Specifically, State Farm argued that no evidence indicated that Stafford knew that Brian was in a dangerous position and that, even if Stafford did know that Brian was in a dangerous position, “there is no indication that a sufficient amount of time passed in which to allow a preventative effort” by Stafford.
Next, State Farm argued that the trial court erred by allowing the wantonness claim to go to the jury because, it said, there was insufficient evidence to support that claim. As they did regarding the subsequent negligence issue, the Woods argued that State Farm did not preserve this argument because, the Woods said,
State Farm did not specifically object to the proposed wantonness charge at the charge conference. The court concluded, however, that State Farm’s wantonness argument was preserved for appeal.
Although State Farm preserved its argument that there was insufficient evidence to support sending the wantonness claim to the jury, State Farm did not present a sufficient record allowing the court to review that issue.
According to case law, the court said it must presume that there was evidence to support the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for a JML and the jury’s verdict, and the judgment on the verdict was due to be affirmed in this regard.
Although the judgment as to this issue was due to be affirmed on the above discussed ground, the court noted that State Farm’s wantonness argument was without merit.
It was undisputed that Stafford’s vehicle collided with Brian’s vehicle in the pass-through lane. Brian’s testimony was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Stafford suddenly changed lanes very shortly before the accident. That evidence, the court said, combined with evidence of speeding, was evidence that supported a claim of wantonness.
The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Brian M. Wood and Jennifer A. Wood—Supreme Court of Alabama—No. SC-2022-0901—October 20, 2023.
